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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUABTEBLY
THE DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY BREACH AS AP-
PLIED IN WEST VIRGINIA
ROBERT J. RILEY*
The general law of contracts as we all know is the result of a
process of growth extending over many centuries. During this
period of development, however, the changes have been gradual
and for the most part merely the result of reasoning based upon
premises already well recognized in the law. In certain instances
though, new chapters or additions have been made to the law of
contracts by the adoption of ideas rather radically different from
the then known theory of the law and seemingly based upon
unrecognized premises. One of the more recent of these develop-
ments is what is commonly called the doctrine of anticipatory
breach.
As its name implies, this doctrine does not deal with the ordinary
breach of the performance of a contract, but is concerned only
with the right of a party to a contract to sue immediately for a
breach to be made at some future time.'
While some inconsistencies exist in the law dealing with the
repudiation of contracts, yet it may safely be said that formerly
the general law has been that where a party renounces or renders
himself unable to perform a contract prior to the date set for
performance the alternative of either of two courses of action was
open to the injured party. In the first place, he could act upon
the repudiation or renunciation by rescinding the entire contract.
The contract being rescinded and no longer having force and effect
neither party could complain on the date set for performance if
the other actually defaulted. Gradually from this situation the
law was extended to allow the injured party to recover the value
of any part performance made by him before the renunciation oc-
curred. So, if plaintiff contracted to purchase a horse from de-
* Member Wheeling, W. Va., Bar.
CLARK, CONTRACTS, 243-244; WILLSTON, CONTRACTS §1296. "Contracts," Dac.
D1G. (Key No.) 313. CENT. DIG. § 1279.
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fendant on June 1, for $100, making an immediate payment of
$10 on account, then if defendant renounced the contract on May
first, plaintiff could at once elect to rescind the whole contract,
and could recover back the $10 paid by him. This recovery, of
course, could not be made on the contract as it had been rescinded
but upon a quantum meruit.
The second course of action open to the injured party was that
he could remain stolid and ignoring the repudiation of the con-
tract made by the other party, allow the contract to remain in full
force and effect. He had no remedy at the time of the renuncia-
tion as the date for performance had not arrived and no actual
breach had occurred.2  In the suppositious case plaintiff then
would be forced to wait until June 1 for his remedy when if defend-
ant failed to deliver the horse according to the promise made, an
actual breach having resulted, plaintiff could sue on the contract
for his damages.
The law remained crystallized in regard to cases of this kind
until the celebrated case of Hocister v. De La Tour was decided in
England in 1853.3 Here defendant contracted to employ plaintiff
to travel as his courier, starting June 1, 1851. On May 11, defend-
ant wrote plaintiff stating that his services were not required.
Plaintiff brought his suit on May 22, which was prior to the date
set for performance. Objection was made that the suit was pre-
maturely brought, but the court held that a declaration by defend-
ant that he intended to break his contract constituted a breach
of the contract on which plaintiff could sue immediately. The
decision was grounded on the theory that it would be a serious in-
jury to plaintiff to require him to wait till the day of performance
to see if defendant would then perform, as he could not seek labor
in the meanwhile but would be compelled to remain in readiness
to perform himself. Thus finding reason for this decision in
convenience the court implied a promise that during the life of the
contract neither 'party would do anything inconsistent with the
relationship established by it.
This case by inaugurating the doctrine of anticipatory breach
gave to the injured party another course he might elect to follow
where the contract had been renounced prior to the date for per-
formance. Instead of resting on his rights until an actual breach
occurred, or rescinding the contract, he may now elect to treat the
renunciation as an actual breach and may bring an immediate
2 Philpotts v. Evans, 5 M. & W. 475, 151 Eng. Reprint 200 (1839), Opinions of
Baron Parke.
3 2 U. & B. 678, 118 Eng. Reprint 922 (1853).
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suit for damages. West Virginia follows the weight of authority
and allows the election to pursue either of these three remedies.'
The doctrine of anticipatory breach from a humble beginning
has become to be almost of universal acceptation. It is the law
in England, in Canada, in our federal courts and in a great major-
ity of our states, including West Virginia.' The rule in this state
is best laid down in the case of Davis v. Grand Rapids School Fur-
niture Company, Syllabus 1, of which case reads as follows:
"Where a party to a contract notifies the other that he does
not intend to abide by or perform it, the other may bring an
immediate suit for such damages as he may thereby have sus-
tained, without waiting for the time of performance to expire.'
In this case the plaintiff had leased his theatre in Huntington
to a party starting September 1, opera chairs to be provided and in
place. He contracted with the defendant company in February
through their local agent for the purchase of the chairs. Thirty
days later defendant notified him that it would not fill the con-
tract. Plaintiff brought suit on June 3. Held: Plaintiff had right
to take defendant at his word that he would not perform and
could bring his suit immediately.
As far as the history of this doctrine is concerned, it is under-
stood that the decision of Hochster v. De La Tour was based on a
series of cases dealing with breach of the marriage contract, and
upon property cases which in reality do not justify the decision.'
It has always been recognized that the doctrine of anticipatory
breach is justified in cases involving breach of the marriage con-
tract, but the logic of the extension of its use to other classes of
contracts is not so clear. The reason for the exception in case of
contracts to marry may readily be seen. For example: Where
parties contract to marry on June 1 but on May 1 D changes her
mind and marries X, then an immediate cause of action accrues
to P. By her action D has repudiated the contract and has
rendered performance impossible on her part, but more than this
she has caused an actual breach to occur. It is well established
that a contract to marry creates a certain status or relation be-
tween the parties, namely that of betrothment, and by reason of
the existence of this status there is an implied obligation not to
fBare, Admr. etc., v. Victoria coal & Coke Co., 73 W. Va. 632, 80 S. E. 941
(1914).
G England-Hochster v. De La Tour, supra. Canada-Dalrymple v. Scott, 19 Ont.
App. 477, 483. U. S.-Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 44 L. Ed. 953, 20 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 780 (1900).
8 41 W. Va. 717, 24 S. E. 630 (1896).
7 Williston, Repudiation of Contract. 14 HAnV. L. REv. 429-431, citing Ford v.
Tiley. 6 B. & C. 325 108 Eng. Reprint 472 (1827) ; Heard v. Bowers, 23 Pick. 455,
460 (1839).
3
Riley: The Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach as Applied in West Virginia
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1925
ANTICIPATORY BREACH
do anything inconsistent with it. This is true only of the contract
of marriage as it is in this case alone that a status is created by
virtue of the contract. This view is expressed in the leading case
of Frost v. Knight, and is followed by our own Supreme Court."
The following is quoted from the opinion in the case of Connolly
v. Bollinger:
"A contract of marriage is peculiar and distinct in this, that
it establishes, at once and before the consummation of the mar-
riage, a relation of confidence between the parties and alters
their status. From the moment the contract is made, the parties
are betrothed. The breach thereof, by renunciation or repudia-
tion, ipso facto destroys the relation so established, alters the sit-
uation of the parties and works injury."'
No true status is created by contracts other than for marriage."
Therefore while suit before the date of performance for renuncia-
tion of the marriage contract is justifiable because an actual breach
has occurred, yet in other contracts no status exists between the
parties and a repudiation prior to the day of performance does
not constitute an actual breach. It is illogical to allow suit before
the date of performance, because in doing so the court holds that
the defendant has breached the contract now when his promise
only requires performance on a future day. Thus in reality the
promise made by offending party is in a certain sense enlarged
without his consent. This view is taken by Massachusetts which
forcibly condemns the majority rule. 1 Recognizing the well estab-
lished exception of the marriage contract, the doctrine of antici-
patory breach has no basis in logic and must be looked upon merely
as the child of convenience. Without question it is more con-
venient to be allowed a remedy by suit at the time of renunciation
rither than to require a delay until the actual breach occurs.
Contracting parties are also saved the uncertainty of waiting for
the date of performance wondering if the contract is to be per-
formed or not. It would seem though that when all interests are
weighed the convenience created by the doctrine of anitcipatory
breach fully justifies its offense to logic.
Assuming the existence of the contract, in order for the doc-
trine of anticipatory breach to apply it is first necessary that there
b5e a breach or renunciation of the contract to take effect at some
future time, i. e., the day of performance. This breach may be in
the form of an oral or written declaration that the offending party
s L. R. 7 Ex. Ill (1872).9 67 w. va. 37, 67 S. E. 71 (1910).
10 Connolly v. Bolllnger, supra..
1 Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, 19 Am. Rep. 384 (1874).
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will not perform, or it may be a renunciation implied from the
conduct of the party.12 The breach may occur while the contract
is still executory or it may occur in the course of performance and
relate only to acts to be performed at a later time. The case of
Hochster v. De La Tour is an example of a breach while the con-
tract was still executory.13  When several shipments have been
made under a contract to deliver coal over a period of time, a
declaration by the seller that after July 1, he would no longer
deliver would constitute a breach in the course of performance.
Most of the cases decided by the Supreme Court of West Virginia
deal with this style of breach and the court applies the doctrine
of anticipatory breach though in fact in most instances an actual
breach of the contract had occurred and the aid of this doctrine
need not have been invoked.' 4  Syllabus 2 of the case of Pancake
v. George Campbell Co., reads:
"Where there is a contract for the sale of goods and the pur-
chaser repudiates the contract, and refuses to consummate it by
acceptance of the goods, the seller may at once sue for damages
for breach of the contract, without waiting for the period for the
delivery of the goods to elapse, and without tender of them." 1 '
Here P contracted to sell 1000 tons of bark to D, delivery to
be made between August 1, 1893, and June 1, 1894. P later
offered to deliver under the terms of the contract but D refused
to accept any deliveries and P brought suit on September 20. It
is submitted that since P was privileged to make delivery any time
between the dates named, an actual breach of the entire contract
occurred when D refused the tender made. Independently of the
doctrine of anticipatory breach suit could have been brought on
the contract for all damages suffered as the breach clearly went
to the entire contract. Instead of basing the decision on a method
of reasoning identical with the doctrine of anticipatory breach,
should not the ordinary test governing the actual repudiation of
contracts have been applied? Was the breach a substantial one
going to the entire contract, so that the injured party would not
12 By conduct: Roberts v. American Column & Lumber Co., 76 W. Va. 290, 85
S. E. 535 (1915) ; Lewis v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 76 W. Va. 103, 84 S. D. 1068
(1915).
Oral: Davis v. Grand Rapids School Furniture Co., supra, Bare, Admr. v. Victoria
Coal & Coke Co., supra.
Written: James & Mitchell v. Adams, 16 W. Va. 245 (1880) ; Chapman v. J. W.
Beltz & Sons Co., 48 W. Va. 1, 35 S. E. 1013, (1900).
23 Executory: Davis v. Grand Rapids School Furniture Co., supra; Connolly V.
Bollinger, supra.
In course of performance: James & Mitchell v. Adams, supra; Pancake v. George
-Campbell Co., 44 W. Va. 82, 28 S. E. 719 (1897) ;; Miller v. Jones, 68 W. Va. 526,
71 S. E. 248 (1911) ; Bare Admr. v. Victoria Coal & Coke Co., supra.
14 Pancake et al., v. George Campbell Co., supra; Miller v. Jones, supra; Catlett v.
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get substantially what he bargained for 116 In the given ease the
refusal of D to accept the bark within the time provided for
delivery was absolute and was a substantial breach going to the
entire contract. It was an actual breach as it was refusal to accept
at a time when D was required to deliver. An examination of
decisions in West Virginia involving contracts where a breach has
occurred in the course of performance will show that in a majority
of such cases a substantial breach was actually made which would
have entitled the plaintiff to recover independently of the doctrine
of anticipatory breach. To invoke this doctrine in such cases
effects the same result as far as recovery is concerned, but it re-
quires that the decision of the court be reached by a method of
reasoning in reality inapplicable.
As previously stated, for purposes of invoking the doctrine of
anticipatory breach it is necessary that a breach or renunciation
of the contract be shown. This breach may be in the form of an
oral or written renunciation of the contract or a material part
thereof by one of the contracting parties. The elements essential
to such a declaration have been clearly defined by the West Vir-
ginia Supreme court.17 The cases seem to require that the re-
nunciation be distinct, unequivocal and absolute and deal with
the entire performance of the contract. Thus the statement made
which is to be regarded as a renunciation of the contract must be
clear and unambiguous, must definitely renounce the contract and
show an intention not to perform The renunciation must also
go to a material part of the contract and a refusal to perform an
immaterial part thereof will not be regarded as a breach of the
entire contract.18
The repudiation of the contract either prior to the date of
performance or in the course of performance may be made by con-
duct of one of the contracting parties."
In cases of repudiation by conduct the same elements are re-
quired to constitute a breach or repudiation as where there is an
oral or written renunciation. This conduct must show a clear and
absolute intention to revoke the contract, and must relate to the
performance of the entire contract or a material part thereof.
W 24 Am. & Eng. ie. 644; J. W. Ellison, Son & Co. v. Flat Top Grocery Co. 69
W. Va. 380, 387.
iT Bannister v. Coal & Coke Co., 63 W. Va. 502, 61 S. E. 338 (1908) ; Bare, Admr.
etc. v. Victoria Coal & Coke Co., supra; Peerless Carbon Black Co., v. Gillespie. 87
W. Va. 441, 464, 105 S. E. 517 (1920); Poling, Trustee, v. Coudon-Lane Boom
Lumber Co., 55 W. Va. 529, 47 S. E. 279 (1904); J. W. Ellison Son company v.
Flat Top Grocery Co., supra.
I J. W. Ellison Son Company v. Flat Top Grocery company, 69 W. Va. 380, 71 S.
M. 391 (1911).
19 Pancake et al., v. George Campbell Co., supra; Lewis .v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper
Co., supra; Roberts v. American Column & Lumber Co., supra.
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A clear example of this is where D, one of the parties to contract
to marry, would breach it by marrying X, a third party. The de-
fault goes to the entire contract and D has clearly rendered per-
formance impossible by marrying X.
Assuming the existence of a valid contract, and a complete re-
nunciation or breach thereof prior to the day of performance,
may the delinquent party change his mind and come in later with
an offer of performance? Clearly such offer can have no effect
if made after suit is brought for the breach made. 0 A strong
stand against allowing the delinquent party to repent is taken by
the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of Roehm v.
ffurst.21 In cases involving breach of a marriage contract a sub-
sequent offer of performance after the defendant has renounced
or breached the contract is of no force and effect, and an action
for damages will lie even in the face of such an offer.2- This stand
is taken by the court due to fact that a status is created by the con-
tract and once a breach has occurred the relationship of betroth-
ment to which both parties are entitled is interrupted, and the
damage has accrued regardless of a later willingness to again re-
new this relationship. West Virginia coincides with this view but
regards this type of case as being an exception to the rules laid
down determining the right of the delinquent or offending party
to repent. Aside from this exception, authority in this state
seems to hold that once having breached or renounced the contract
the offending party may repent prior to the day set for perform-
ance unless the injured party has elected to treat this conduct
as a breach.23 An offer of performance then made subsequently
and before plaintiff had elected to treat defendant's conduct as a
breach would be a good defense to a suit on the contract. Such
is the holding in the ease of Swiger v. Hayman, where the court
stated that:
"A mere declaration, by one of the parties to an executory
contract, of an intention not to perform it, which is retracted
almost immediately and before any declaration has been made or
act done by the other party in respect to such renunciation, and
before injury therefrom has resulted to him or a change in his
situation or the condition of the subject matter has occurred,
does not constitute a breach, unless, perhaps, in the case of a
contract of marriage, or other similar contract, imposing pecu-
"' Connolly V. Bolllnger, supra.
2 Supra.
22 Coznolly v. Bollinger, supra.
= Bannister v. Coal & coke Co., suvra, 510 of opinion; Swiger v. Hayman, 56
W. Va. 123, 48 S. . 839 (1904); Smoot v. U. S., 15 wall. 36, 21 L. 1I5, 107(1873) ; Dingely v. Oler, 117 U. S. 490, 29 L. Ed. 984 (1886).
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liar obligations upon the parties during the time intervening
between the making and performance thereof."1
24
The courts differ in determining what is required of the injured
party, or plaintiff, to show that he has elected to treat the of-
fending party's conduct as a breach. Some jurisdictions demand
that he change his position in some way in reliance on defendant's
repudiation, as by purchasing from or selling to someone else in
reliance upon defendant's act or declaration, thus creating some-
thing in the nature of an estoppel.22 West Virginia seems merely
to require a declaration or act showing a clear and unequivocal
intention to treat the defendant's conduct as a breach.26
Perhaps one of the strongest objections to the doctrine of an-
ticipatory breach is made on the ground that recovery is allowed
of damages which are highly speculative. For purpose of orderly
discussion the cases must be considered from two distinct view-
points: first, where a trial is had after the day of performance;
second, where the trial takes place prior to the day of performance.
In the first class of cases the damages suffered generally are clearly
capable of being ascertained, and the same rule should be applied
in cases of anticipatory breach as in the ordinary case of the repud-
iation of a contract. West Virginia allows the plaintiff to recover
the profits he would have made under the contract, together with
the value of any expenditures made by him by reason of the
contract.2? In a contract for the sale of chattels or a commodity
the measure of profit would be the difference between the contract
price and the cost or market price. Some confusion arises, how-
ever, where recovery is made upon the doctrine of anticipatory
breach, in determining whether damages shall be computed by the
use of the cost or market price at the time and place of perform-
ance or at the time and place of the repudiation. This question
has not been directly passed upon in West Virginia. In some
jurisdictions the latter standard has been adopted, but the better
rule seems to be that the cost or market price aT. the time of the
performance should govern.2 8  This is the only logical view to
be taken as, while the breach or repudiation may have occurred to-
day, yet it is a breach to take effect at a subsequent time, namely,
the time of performance, and damages should be governed by con-
ditions existing at that time.
In cases involving the doctrine of anticipatory breach where
a trial is had prior to the date of delivery or performance, the
4 Supra.
; Dingely v. Oler, supra.
Dictum in Swiger v. Hayman, supra.
Catlett v. Bloyd, 83 W. Va. 776, 99 S. E. 81 (1919; Polino v. Keck, 80 W. Va.
426. 92 S. R. 665 (1917) ; Bare, Admr. v. Victoria Coal & Coke Co., stupra.
t Windmuller v. Pope, 107 N. Y. 674, 14 N. B. 436 (1887) ; Williston, Repudia-
tion of Contracts, 14 HAnv. L. REv. 421, 441.
8
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damages are incapable of accurate determination in most cases
and are somewhat speculative. It is towards this type of case that
criticism has been mostly directed. Here again some courts allow
damages to be computed on the basis of conditions and prices
existing on the day the contract was repudiated. 9 It would seem
better though to accept the latest evidence obtainable, if possible,
using the cost and prices existing the day previous to the intro-
duction of the testimony as the test for the computation. In this
way generally a more accurate idea can be gained as to the price
and conditions existing on the day of performance than by accept-
ing conditions on the day of the breach or repudiation as the
gauge. That the damages allowed in either case are speculative
may readily be seen, especially in contracts involving the manu-
facture and sale of chattels or commodities where prices fluctuate
or where transportation and labor costs directly affect the measure
of profit of the vendor. For example, where A, in West Virginia,
on March 1st, contracts to deliver coal from his mine to B, f. o. b.
Norfolk, Virginia, from June 1st, to December 1st, at the rate of
one hundred tons per day, for which B contracts to pay at the
rate of $3.00 per ton. On April 1st, B repudiated the entire con-
tract without cause and A brought his suit for damages immediate-
ly. Assuming that there is no market for A's coal, what is he en-
titled to recover? His measure of recovery would be the expendi-
tures made by him under the contract plus the profit he would
have made. The difficulty then arises of showing what that profit
would be. Whereas, on the day of trial or on the day the breach
occurred A might be able to mine and deliver coal f. o. b. Norfolk
at a cost of $2.00 per ton, giving him a profit of $100 per day
on his contract, yet due to increased transportation rates and
cost of labor, on December 1st, and during the actual term of the
performance of the contract this measure of profit might be wholly
eliminated, or, assuming the reverse condition, it might possibly
be doubled. In view of this problem it would seem that the com-
putation of damages by the proof of prices and conditions existing
at the last possible day before the introduction of the evidence
would more nearly arrive at a true and just test. Having re-
pudiated the contract the defendant must bear the risks of his
act and cannot complain that no accurate measurement can be
made of the resulting damages."
As far as pure theory is concerned, West Virginia has followed
w Roehm v. Horst, supra; Jebeles & Colico Confectionery Co., v. Stephenson, 6
Ala. App. 103, 60 So. 437 (1912).
30 Roehm v. Hurst, suprm, p. 21 of opinio n.
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the doctrine of Hochster v. De Lat Tour with some care and as h re-
sult the law on the doctrine of anticipatory breach is well defined.
The custom has not prevailed as yet in this state to create except-
ions to the general rule which has been the practice in those juris-
dictions where the courts have looked upon this doctrine with a
less friendly eye.
10
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